Migration control, drug trafficking, authoritarian governments and trade imbalances will be among the priorities of the new Trump administration toward Latin America. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the 53-year-old senator, the first Latino to hold the highest post in the star-spangled diplomacy.

What is important for the new administration in its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean? First, foreign policy will take a back seat, and in that context, the priorities are related to the strategic interests of the United States in its relations with Iran. Second, with the Gulf and the oil exporting countries. Third, in maintaining some relations with Israel that no longer concern the conditions in Palestine. And fourth, Ukraine and Europe in general and relations with NATO. So Latin America will be in fifth or sixth place in the global context.

Everything will also depend on how the new Secretary of State moves. If Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba take priority over other political problems, such as the conflict in Bolivia, instability in Haiti, the migration problem in the Northern Triangle, or the problem of fentanyl exports from Mexico, without forgetting US trade and investment
in Latin America.

Over the past 20 years, the number one priority for the United States has been migration and the second is violence and drug trafficking, especially fentanyl and cocaine. Trade relations and governance have competed for third place. Today, the issue of dictatorships, in principle, is third on the agenda of Latin America and the Caribbean. Nicaragua is subordinate to what is happening in Venezuela, but it also depends on how the new secretary of state who is responsible for foreign policy will move. Maduro and Ortega know that they have a sworn enemy in the new secretary of state.

Regarding the economic aspect of trade relations, the situation becomes more complex because there are trade agreements that are being reviewed (such as the one between Mexico, the United States and Canada), others that need to be updated (CAFTA-DR); there are also considerations on how to promote more investment from the United States in those countries and while the trade opening of Latin America is reversed or contained in China. The spectre of imposing tariffs on some imported products is very real and that includes taxes on cars imported from Mexico or on the manufacture of Chinese raw materials.

Some determinants that would formulate priorities in all these problems also depend on three major realities, first, Trump’s team. It is a team that works, that has formulated a strategy for Latin America, that includes personalities with a trajectory in relation to Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua and have their perspectives, their political reading of what must be done with these regimes.

In other words, Caracas, Havana, and Managua could face increased pressure with Cuban-American Marco Rubio appointed as the next secretary of state. Similarly, Congressman Mike Waltz, nominated as national security advisor, has been one of the strongest critics of these regimes. Together with other Republican politicians from Florida — such as Senator Rick Scott, Congressmen Carlos Gimenez, Mario Diaz-Balart, Maria Elvira Salazar, Debbie Wasserman Schultz, and Texas Senator Ted Cruz — they are likely to gain more influence in shaping U.S. policies toward Latin American countries within the Republican Party.

Each of these countries is different. This shows signs of the possibility of negotiating a pragmatic exit with Venezuela as a scenario at the negotiating table. Meanwhile, the situation in Cuba can be seen from the viewpoint of letting things fall by weight and of its country collapsing, or facilitating that collapse with some kind of tactical pressure or rapprochement with the military establishment to facilitate a transition
in that country.

Nicaragua, on the other hand, is a nuisance to many foreign policy influencers in the Republican Party, and there is a belief that it is time to put Ortega in his place. However, this also depends on how laws like Renacer are implemented and a very likely passage of the proposed Nica Act 2.0 in 2025. This team, as in any public policy context, will interact with a bureaucracy that generally tends to be more reactive than proactive, more conservative in its action, especially in the selection
of pressure tools.

It is also important to consider the short-term or long-term vision of the president-elect’s team and the bureaucratic establishment.
The Biden administration has seen the region’s problems as long-term challenges and has measured its policies in that area. It is unclear how urgently the Trump team contemplates a more proactive policy towards Latin America.

The question of how to demonstrate a policy change will depend on what issues they will have to report to the region and how urgently and expected it is that they will do so. Furthermore, this vision will define whether sanctions, trade sanctions, multilateral pressure with allies such as Argentina or military manoeuvres are the preferred choice.

The latter is vital, since for Donald Trump a key reality is the legacy, he wants to be printed in the history books. Will it be the legacy of the president who stopped migration, and expelled millions of irregular migrants? The president who took the warlord autocrats out of power in Latin America?, the leader who has proven to have stopped Chinese trade expansionism and investment in the region or the president who has restored economic and hegemonic presence?

On the issue of migration, even if migration is down, remittances are also down and these economies do not have a sustainable economic model of sustainability, while remittances alleviate this vulnerability. A decline in remittances due to a decline in migration will ultimately mean a new wave of migration in 2025.

On the other hand, there are contrasting elections in the process, starting with Bolivia and Honduras (late 2025) and Colombia and Nicaragua (2026). These are factors that need to be studied in the foreign policy of the incoming administration to anticipate its development and what they will do about it.

What is clear is that governments like those of Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela and politicians like Evo Morales have a preferentially negative place for this incoming administration.

Reducing migration; containing transnational organized crime, especially cocaine trafficking networks and the production and export of fentanyl; confronting dictatorships and autocratic forces operating in the region; promoting a more strategic economic relationship that encompasses the mutual interests of the region beyond free trade.

These are the parameters by which the incoming administration will define its policy and by which the responsible senior officials will decide to synchronize them with the broader agenda that must be implemented with a government that will have a high concentration of power.

Manuel Orozco
Latin America Analyst