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Herbs & Plants. Rauvolfia vomitoria. The versatile therapeutic plant.

It is a versatile plant with a wide range of uses. Its role in traditional medicine has led to its integration into the pharmaceutical industry.

The plant, which belongs to the Apocynaceae family, is commonly known as “devil’s pepper”, a name that reflects its potent properties and peculiarities. This shrub or small tree, which can reach a height of up to 8 metres, is a formidable presence in its habitat. Unlike its younger counterparts, the older parts of the plant are conspicuously devoid of latex, distinguishing it from related species within the same botanical family.The Rauvolfia vomitoria plant is characterised by whorled branches decorated with enlarged and clumpy nodes.
Its leaves, arranged in groups of three, vary in shape from elliptic-acuminate to broadly lanceolate, contributing to the overall density and texture of the plant’s foliage.

The therapeutic versatility of Rauvolfia vomitoria is reflected in its wide range of uses. CC BY-SA 3.0/ Ehoarn Bidault

The small but sweet-scented flowers of Rauvolfia vomitoria are nestled in inflorescences whose branches are strikingly pubescent, giving a subtle tactile sensation when touched. The corolla lobes of the flowers are barely visible, suggesting specialised pollination mechanisms or adaptations within its ecological niche.
As the plant matures, it produces fleshy fruits that ripen to a bright red, attracting the attention of both human observers and potential seed dispersers in the wild. This vibrant display of colour further enhances Rauvolfia vomitoria‘s ornamental value, contributing to its aesthetic appeal in natural landscapes.
Devil’s Pepper has been revered throughout Africa for centuries for its myriad therapeutic properties. This shrub or small tree has attracted considerable attention in traditional medicine for its remarkable efficacy in treating a range of ailments, from diarrhoea and malaria to high blood pressure and male infertility.
Throughout Africa, Rauvolfia vomitoria is a staple of indigenous pharmacopoeias, with traditional uses ranging from the treatment of skin infections to snakebites. Harvested from the wild for local medicinal purposes, every part of the tree is used.

Rauvolfia vomitoria has been used for centuries to treat psychiatric disorders, insomnia and manic tendencies. CC BY-SA 4.0/Ji-Elle

The therapeutic versatility of Rauvolfia vomitoria is reflected in its wide range of uses. Decoctions or extracts of its roots are used to treat diarrhoea, jaundice, venereal diseases, rheumatism, snakebites, colic, fever, anxiety, epilepsy and hypertension. In addition, macerated roots or mashed fruit are used for various skin conditions, while bark, twigs and leaves are used as a laxative and emetic.
In addition, root decoctions, macerates or powders are used throughout the plant’s range to treat high blood pressure and as a sedative for people with epilepsy or psychiatric conditions. Infused in palm wine, the roots are believed to have aphrodisiac properties and are used to treat female sterility.
Despite its toxicity, Rauvolfia vomitoria has uses beyond medicine. Pastes made from pulverised roots are used to coat arrowheads and spears for hunting, and mixed with manioc meal as rat poison. Interestingly, the plant is also sought after to enhance athletic performance, underlining its diverse cultural and practical importance.
Rauvolfia vomitoria has been used for centuries to treat psychiatric disorders, insomnia and manic tendencies. Its role in traditional medicine has led to its integration into the pharmaceutical industry, where compounds extracted from the plant, including, deserpidine, ajmalicine and ajmaline, are used in various medicines.

Despite its toxicity, Rauvolfia vomitoria has uses beyond medicine. CC BY-SA 4.0/Scamperdale

Externally, Rauvolfia vomitoria root products are used to treat skin conditions such as rashes, pimples, chicken pox, wounds, scabies, psoriasis, leprosy, haemorrhoids, head lice and parasitic skin diseases. Decoctions of the root are used in massages and baths to relieve fatigue and rheumatismand in mouthwashes to treat gingivitis or thrush.
In addition to its medicinal uses, Rauvolfia vomitoria has other utilitarian uses. Young twigs are used as stirring sticks for drinks, while larger branches stir indigo mixtures in dyeing pits. The bark provides a yellow dye and its fibre has many uses. The wood is of little economic importance, although it is occasionally used for small kitchen utensils and as fuel.As communities continue to harness its healing potential and explore its practical uses, Rauvolfia vomitoria remains a testament to the profound interplay between nature and human ingenuity in addressing health and societal needs. (Open Photo: Rauvolfia vomitoria. CC BY-SA 4.0/Cyrille Mas)

Richard Komakech

Japan-Russia: Relations at a Low.

A century after the signing of the 1925 treaty normalising their relations, Japan and Russia are more at odds than ever. Between diplomatic tensions, territorial disputes and demonstrations of force, tensions between the two countries have continued to grow, in a global context marked by the war in Ukraine and the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea.

January 20 marked the 100th anniversary of the Soviet-Japanese Basic Convention (Nisso Kihon Jōyaku), a treaty that normalized relations between the Empire of Japan and the Soviet Union, signed in 1925 by Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan of the Soviet Union and Kenkichi Yoshizawa of the Empire of Japan. The signing of the Soviet-Japanese Basic Convention resulted from long negotiations, some twenty years after the end of the war between the Russian Empire and the Japanese Empire (February 1904 – September 1905).

One hundred years later, almost everything seems to be against relations, especially in political and geopolitical terms. This situation has sent shockwaves throughout the region and the world, which continue to be exacerbated by the tense relations between the two countries, which have reached their “historic low” in decades.

Yet for Tokyo and Moscow, this anniversary could have been a rare opportunity to put the now-scarred bilateral Russian-Japanese relations back on a firmer footing by celebrating this symbolic anniversary.
But that was not the case, as various events and statements in early 2025 have further distanced the world’s ninth and twelfth most populous nations.

A terse statement to Tokyo
To mark January 20, 2025, Russian authorities simply sent their Japanese neighbour a terse statement. The statement focused less on the signing of the treaty 100 years ago than on the tense bilateral situation at the time, with a very sensitive territorial dispute between the two states over the Kuril archipelago: “The Russian side starts from the fact that there are still sensitive politicians and personalities in Japan who are aware of the harmful anti-Russian orientation of the official authorities and its negative consequences for the Japanese people” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 27, 2025).

The next day, this message was followed by another Russian decision, more of a sanction than a celebration: Moscow cancelled a bilateral agreement that for decades had allowed several Japanese-funded cultural centres to operate on Russian soil. These centres were supposed to work to forge closer economic and interpersonal ties. This sudden closure, called unacceptable by the Japanese government, is an eloquent symbol of the Russo-Japanese disenchantment of recent years.

However, the Kremlin did not stop in its provocation. A few days later, Russian forces deployed two Tu-95 bombers accompanied by two advanced Su-35 fighters over the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan for 8 long hours, forcing Tokyo to scramble its fighters to intercept the bombers that had penetrated the Japanese air defence identification zone, raising the ire of the Japanese authorities. Already last September, Tokyo had expressed its irritation over the incursion on three occasions of a Russian reconnaissance plane into Japanese airspace near Hokkaido.

Japan was declared a “hostile country” by Russia.
These repeated challenges reflect the sorry state of bilateral relations, which some observers say have reached their lowest point in a century. The fragile Russo-Japanese relationship has steadily weakened since 2022, when Russian officials officially designated Japan as a “hostile country,” even though Tokyo had just joined Western democracies in denouncing Russian aggression in Ukraine and related sanctions.

Inevitably, this has left a host of issues unresolved that cannot progress in this situation, such as the already very uncertain negotiations for a peace treaty between the two countries. Like the two neighbouring Koreas, which still have not concluded a peace treaty since the end of the 1950-1953 inter-Korean conflict, Japan remains technically at war with Russia in 2025, 80 years after the end of World War II.

Another source of continuing disagreement is the resolution of the territorial dispute over the Kuril archipelago (also beset by formidable obstacles). For the record, the quartet of islands at the centre of the dispute (the “Northern Territories” for Tokyo, 1,200 km northeast of the Japanese capital) lies between the Japanese peninsula of Hokkaido and the Russian peninsula of Kamchatka. In the final days of World War II, despite the two countries having signed a neutrality pact in April 1941, the Soviet Union seized these islands in the wake of the commitments made at the Yalta Conference (February 1945). This “acquisition” was never accepted by Tokyo.

Pyongyang and Moscow are getting closer
However, with the Treaty of San Francisco (1951), which officially ended hostilities between the Allied Powers and Japan, the latter renounced its claims to the Kurils. However, Tokyo still insists that the four southernmost islands of this coveted archipelago are historically Japanese and as such could not have been explicitly ceded to anyone else. The Kremlin, of course, does not have much sympathy
for this interpretation.

To make matters worse, bilateral relations have recently been aggravated by the open rapprochement between Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Kim Jong-un’s hereditary dictatorship in North Korea. These include Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea in June 2024, Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia in September 2023, and the thousands of North Korean soldiers who have joined Moscow’s forces on various Russian-Ukrainian fronts.

Japan is a regular rhetorical target of North Korean propaganda: in fact, Pyongyang has long considered Tokyo an enemy (like Seoul and Washington), also because of the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula between 1910 and 1945. As a result, the archipelago is rarely spared from the bellicose and disproportionate outbursts of a North Korean regime that is not new to this type of exercise – or from the launches of North Korean medium and long-range ballistic missiles that improperly fly over Japanese airspace (as in October 2022) or end their journey in the Sea of Japan (as in July 2023, March 2024 and January 2025). (Open Photo: the flags of Japan and Russia. 123rf)

Olivier Guillard/Ad Extra

Gambia. The enigma of three countries in one.

The lack of a government agricultural policy, the impact of imports, fishing agreements and climate change all have a direct impact on Gambians’ diets. Local initiatives to increase fruit and vegetable production aim to address these issues. Three young Gambian women are working on a fertiliser that will improve the country’s
agricultural opportunities.

Almost all of a country’s politics can be summed up in a plate of food. When it’s full, everything is seen in a better perspective. If it becomes empty, nerves set in. But if the mechanisms to fill it are lost, political instability sets in and, eventually, with the exhaustion of hopes for change, flight. In every country, food is usually a brief summary of its history and available resources.
The Gambia River flows through the country of the same name, a strip of land inland from Senegal, on the coast of West Africa. Half a century ago, most of its inhabitants could feed themselves with rice produced in the smallest country in continental Africa. Fish was abundant and was used to prepare recipes such as bennekinno (rice with fish); Peanuts, a crop imposed during the time of British colonialism, gave rise to domoda (rice with peanuts and meat).

Traders at the fish market in Gambia. Fish is becoming more expensive due to the fishing treaties signed with the EU and the arrival of Chinese ships on the country’s coasts. CC BY-SA 4.0/Thukuk

Today these dishes still exist, but it is increasingly difficult to prepare them: only 10% of the rice consumed in Gambia is produced in the country; the rest is imported.
Every increase in the price of petrol, which affects transportation, translates into an increase in food prices in Gambia. Fish is becoming more expensive, also due to the fishing treaties signed with the EU and the arrival of Chinese ships on the coasts of the country. The presence of fishmeal factories, including Chinese-owned ones, which take supplies from the local market, completes an equation that makes life difficult for Gambians. Even vegetables, in a country of farmers, have become inaccessible as a garnish for meals. More and more inhabitants of the country are trying to emigrate, and the numbers prove them right: 28% of the national GDP comes from remittances sent by these migrants, the real lifeboat of an economy where a bag of rice costs more than 30 euros – and the most common monthly income in the informal economy reaches, with a bit of luck, 100 euros.

From Left: Rose Mendy, Veronique Mendy and Sandren Jatta. Photo: Jaume Portell Caño

Rose Mendy, Veronique Mendy and Sandren Jatta, however, do not even consider it: “I would go abroad just to study,” says the first. They met at university, where they studied Agriculture in the same class, and their minds are full of ideas that they want to implement in Gambia. All three work in centres and companies related to what they studied, but their real ambition is to create their own project where they can apply everything they learned at university and in their first job.

Production and food
“I come from a family of farmers, rice growers. At university I learned the techniques that were used to advise my family,” says Sandren Jatta. Born in Berending, she went from being one of the daughters who helped out at home to advising her parents on which techniques to adopt to improve production. She currently works with Rose Mendy, her university classmate, at the National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI), an institution that depends on the government of Gambia.
The goal of NARI is to use different techniques and cultivation methods to increase productivity and, once the results are achieved, share this knowledge with the farmers of the country.

A young boy watering his vegetable garden. “What we produce will influence what we eat” File swm

It is not an office job. Mendy, Jatta and their colleagues spend entire days during the harvesting phase, transporting dozens of kilos of onions and then measuring which experiments have been the most productive: “Many people think that agriculture is a job without prestige, which is why they advised me against it. I studied finance to work in a bank, but the countryside has always interested me”, says Mendy, born in Albreda, on the banks of the Gambia River. His family also grows rice. “What we produce will influence what we eat”, adds Jatta.
In the shops of the country, there are almost no products made in Gambia, apart from bottles of mineral water and cashew nuts packaged in plastic bags. In the markets, a large part of the fruit and vegetables are imported: oranges and apples from South Africa, tomatoes from Morocco, potatoes from the Netherlands or bananas from the Ivory Coast sum up the prospects of a country with almost no industry and stagnant agriculture.

Alternatives
Two figures summarize one of the structural problems of Gambia. Since its independence, the cultivated area has increased very little (9% in 57 years). In that period, the population has multiplied sixfold. The decline in the use of fertilizers has reduced the productivity per hectare of key crops such as rice. This situation has accelerated a demographic change: the movement of the population from rural areas to cities and peri-urban areas. In other words, there has been a rural exodus that has led hundreds of thousands of people to go from being producers to consumers of food.
The failed agricultural policy has created three countries in one: rural Gambia, urban Gambia and the diaspora. Rose, Veronique and Sandren, born between the late 1990s and early 2000s, fit into this perception, in this case through their studies: “When you want to go to university you have to go to urban areas. There is nothing like this in rural areas, so you have to come,” says Rose.

A view of the city of Banjul. “When you want to go to university you must go to urban areas”. Pixabay

Climate change is another of the obstacles that Gambia’s primary sector faces, as explained by Sandren Jatta. For her, four reasons explain the reduction in some harvests, and two of them have to do with global warming: increased salinisation and the lack of rain: “It doesn’t rain but when it finally rains, the amount is very low,” she laments. And she adds that, sometimes, if livestock is not well monitored, the animals can eat part of the harvest. The lack of fertilizers – or their improper use – completes the picture: “Fertilizers are expensive and many people don’t have access to them. Before, farmers were helped more, they received free seeds; now many don’t have them and are subsistence farmers, they don’t have access to education and they don’t know how to use chemical fertilizers optimally and sometimes they apply too much.”
Veronique Mendy is the one who knows the world of fertilizers the most of the three. She works for a company that uses a formula that is perfectly suited to the situation in Gambia: it fills drums with old fish and mixes them with water, garlic and limestone to transform them into fertilizer. According to Mendy, fertilizers are at the heart of the problems of Gambian agriculture: “There are those who don’t have land, but have water; there are those who have water, but no technical knowledge, or are attacked by insects”, she comments.

Young People. “We must encourage young people to go into agriculture. ”CC BY-SA 4.0/DWreporter

And she smiles, proudly, announcing what she is working on: “What we are preparing serves as a fertilizer and an anti-parasitic. The costs are very low and the goal of the team she works with is to produce fertilizers that are cheaper than imported ones. Mendy lists the prices of raw materials: “The fish comes to us for free or almost; The rest does not cost more than 200 dalasi (less than three euros) to make a 50-kilo bag. “We should add the costs of transportation and energy to produce it.” According to her, if they managed to commercialize it, this ingredient could revolutionize Gambian agriculture: considering that a bag of fertilizer costs 33 euros, for the same price Gambian farmers could get several bags of local fish-based fertilizer.

Overcoming obstacles
Many Gambians do not trust products made in Gambia. “Gambians often prefer imported products,” Veronique Mendy notes. But she trusts the product she is learning to make to overcome this reluctance, and she trusts especially the youth: “We must encourage young people
to go into agriculture.”

The Gambia. Women at the Market. “Gambians often prefer imported products”. Pixabay

They want to combine horticulture – Rose and Sandren’s strong point – with livestock farming, which would be used to produce fertilizer – Veronique’s strong point – with manure. Her goal is to achieve the greatest possible self-sufficiency, importing only items that are not produced in the country. At the moment, they are looking for capital to start their investment: “They are helping us to cultivate a hectare and, in our case, we don’t need to hire an expert to advise us: we can do it ourselves,” explains Veronique Mendy. The goal of the project should be combined with other measures such as improved storage and a more stable electricity supply.
The three young women are looking forward to this and other projects. Because they believe that solutions must be found locally. This is surely a way to help many young people to stay and invest their energies in their own country. (Open Photo: The Gambia. People and fishing boats on one of the beaches of the coastal town, Tanji.  Istock/Salvador-Aznar)

Jaume Portell Caño

Christians in Syria. Between cautious optimism and fear.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime gave way to the rapid rise of rebel groups with Islamist roots. The Christian minority reacted with a mix of cautious optimism and deep apprehension as promises of inclusivity from rebel leaders clashed with fears of persecution.

Almost 15 years ago, in 2010, revolutions across the Middle East toppled several dictatorships in what became known as the Arab Spring. For Syria, however, there was no Spring, only a 14-year-long Arab Winter, which saw the country torn apart by a devastating civil war. Syria was never going to be like Tunisia or Egypt. The very delicate balance of ethnic and religious groups – a majority of Sunni Muslims and minorities of Alawites, Druze, Christians and Kurds, among others – made any drastic social change very dangerous. The anti-Assad movement began as a global phenomenon, with some Christians playing a prominent role, but it soon devolved into a radical Sunni uprising.
Like his father before him, Bashar al-Assad ran a bloodthirsty regime, but being Alawite himself, he made sure to keep Islamist radicals under control. Christians in Syria were never free, but they knew that if they kept their heads down, at least they would be safe, so the choice between the jihadists and the regime wasn’t a difficult one to
make for most of them.

Poster with Syrian President Bashar Al Assad on building façade. Bashar al-Assad ran a bloodthirsty regime. Shutterstock/hanohiki

With strong support from Russia, Iran and Iranian proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Syria managed to quell the revolt and squeeze the opposition fighters into Idlib, where they were protected by neighbouring Turkey. At the same time, Kurds in the northeast of the country carved out their own de-facto autonomous state, forming a coalition with Syriac Christians and members of other ethnic minorities. This region became an interesting experiment in democracy, almost unique in the Middle East, with full equal rights and representation for all religious and ethnic groups, as well as parity between men and women in all public positions. Christian militias such as the Syriac Military Council fought alongside the Kurdish YPG in the Syrian Democratic Forces, which worked on the ground to destroy ISIS in Syria with logistical and air support from the US. Although the regime did not look fondly on this democratic experiment, as long as Damascus and the SDF had a common enemy in jihadism, they chose to ignore each other rather than fight. This was the situation at the beginning of December. Essentially, it is a prolonged stalemate with no prospects of changing anytime soon. Syria had become a forgotten conflict while the country continued to wallow in a financial crisis made all the worse by a terrible earthquake in 2023.

Change of scenario in 2022
Russia committed itself to what it initially hoped would be a three-day march on Kyiv, but turned into a years-long gruelling war. This meant that Moscow had to tone down its involvement in disputes elsewhere and had already cost the Armenians a defeat to Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. Meanwhile, Syria’s other allies, Hezbollah, found themselves in a full-scale war with Israel. Rather than simply hurl missiles at each other from across the border, this time, the Israelis decided to go after Hezbollah militants and leaders with all their might. A succession of daring initiatives, such as the boobytrapping of pagers used by Hezbollah for communication, followed by precision strikes, wiped out much of the group’s forces and its entire leadership.

Hezbollah found themselves in a full-scale war with Israel. Shutterstock/nsf2019

Assad’s problem was an overreliance on his allies. In the three years of relative peace, he did little to strengthen his army or, for that matter, to quell disaffection among the population under his control. The rebels, on the other hand, had been training and arming. Nobody thought much of it when they broke out of Idlib to take nearby positions. When they arrived at the outskirts of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, a day or so later, the world expected a showdown and a Russian-backed response that would drive them back north, but it never materialized.
Instead, the Syrian Army forces fled for their lives, while many deserted and joined the rebels’ ranks. In less than a week, the rebels were at the gates of Damascus, resistance was non-existent, and Assad
boarded a plane to Moscow.

Abu Mohammad al-Julani, Transitional President of Syria since 29 January 2025. CC BY 4.0/Mfa.gov.ua

Half a century of dictatorship gone with little more than a whimper. While many Syrians took to the streets to celebrate, Christians braced for the worst.
The main opposition group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was originally an ally of Al-Qaeda. While its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, has gone out of his way to show that the group has changed its attitude towards Christians and other minorities, many feared this was just a clever ploy to ensure Western support. There were incidents in Aleppo, with some rebels threatening Christians and destroying stocks of alcohol, for example, but the feared mass persecution of Christians in Syria had not materialized one week after the fall of Assad’s regime.

Prudent Optimism
Christian leaders began to speak with cautious optimism. There was even a rumour that the Archbishop of Aleppo had been asked to take on the role of governor of the city, although he denied it. While al-Julani’s men from the HTS swept south towards Aleppo, another Syrian faction, this one even more heavily linked to Turkey, was taking the fight to the Kurdishled territories in the northeast. Turkey considers the Kurdish YPG an extension of the PKK, a group that has fought against Ankara’s rule in Turkish Kurdistan. For the past several years, Turkey has been carrying out a military campaign to ensure a buffer zone on the Syrian side of its border. However, this implies the ethnic cleansing not only of Kurds who traditionally live there but also of their Christian allies.

Pilgrimage of the icon ‘Our Lady of Sorrows, Consoler of Syrians’ in Homs. (Photo ACN)

The Kurds still have US support, but whether this will be maintained during a Trump presidency remains to be seen. It is also unclear if Turkey is content to control the areas south of its border or if it wishes to crush the Kurdish-led alliance altogether. If the latter, the prospects for Christians allied to the Kurds are not very promising. If the worst-case scenario materializes, that is, if the new regime in Syria becomes an Islamist regime that persecutes Christians, and the northeast is attacked, Christians can be expected to flee en masse from Syria.
The easiest ways out of the country are into Lebanon or Iraq. Both pose serious problems. Lebanon faces a period of uncertainty. With Assad gone, an already diminished Hezbollah no longer has easy access to weapons and other forms of Iranian support. The end of Hezbollah stranglehold on Lebanese politics could be good news for Christians there, but it could also lead to a power vacuum that will cause a renewal of conflict between different sects, in a throwback to the worst days of the Lebanese civil war.

Liturgical celebration in Aleppo. (Photo ACN)

Even if this does not happen, a new influx of refugees fleeing an Islamist regime in Syria might prove too much to handle for a country that can barely cope with successive waves of refugees, first from Palestine and, more recently, from Syria and Iraq. Of course, a best-case scenario would be that Syria stabilizes and many refugees in Lebanon now decide to return.Regarding Iraq, Syrian Christian refugees from the northeast or elsewhere would probably find a haven in Iraqi Kurdistan and the Nineveh Plains, but the problem is that an Islamist Syria could very well seep over the border into Iraq.Even if the worst days of an ISIS dominated Mosul do not return, the mere threat of revived Islamism anywhere near the traditional Christian homeland of the Nineveh Plains will be enough to drive most of those who have so far chosen to remain in Iraq to leave the country, probably for good.

Turkey and Israel
To put it bluntly, if Syria goes down the path of jihadism, the results for Christians in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq would be apocalyptic, and if those Christian populations give up hope and leave, the Christian presence in the entire Middle East will become a mere relic.
There is hope, however. As we have seen, two of the leading players in this scenario are Turkey and Israel.

Flags of Turkey and Israel. 123rf

Although it would be a step too far to call them allies, the two countries have drawn closer together over the past years, having Iran as a common enemy, and it would not be the first time their interests converge. Azerbaijan’s crushing victory in Karabakh was achieved to a large extent with Turkish support and weapons provided by Israel. Neither Tel Aviv nor Ankara wants a jihadist Syria, and since Israel successfully managed to obliterate Syria’s entire military power in the space of two days after the fall of Assad, a new regime will be completely dependent on Turkish support for now, so should be quite easy to control. If Syria’s new rulers live up to their word and let pragmatism, rather than ideology, guide their actions, then Christians may still be safe in the entire region. However, if history has taught us anything in the past decades, it is that radical Islamist allies one day can become deadly enemies the next. (Open Photo: Blue crosses and towers in monastery Saint Takla in Maalula, Syria. 123rf)

Filipe D’Avillez

Tarzi the revolutionary.

Mahmud Beg Tarzi, was the main figure responsible for the modernisation of Afghanistan in the first two decades
of the 20th century.

One of the exiles Habibullah welcomed was the writer, translator, and constitutionalist Mahmud Beg Tarzi, who had spent his youth in Damascus and would become the main figure responsible for modernizing Afghanistan in the first two decades of the 20th century, Ahmed-Ghosh, Dupree, and Ghafour note.

Mahmud Tarzi. He was revered as “Afghanistan’s greatest intellectual,” and served as ambassador, foreign minister, and war minister. Wikimedia Commons.

“Influenced by the Young Turk Movement, which was then discussing the idea of women’s emancipation and participation in public life, Tarzi entered Kabul with his Syrian wife, Asma, around 1904 and immediately began to advocate for education and job opportunities for women,” Dupree reports. For Tarzi, Ahmed-Ghosh adds, “women deserved full citizenship and were an asset to future generations.” Before him, “no one had ever uttered the words ‘freedom,’ ‘progress,’ or ‘school.’” Hamida Ghafour describes him as “a nationalist” who attributes the decline of the Muslim world “not to Islam, but to what believers did to it.”Tarzi, revered as “Afghanistan’s greatest intellectual,” served as ambassador, foreign minister, and war minister. Two of his daughters married Habibullah’s sons. “These wives were fashion-conscious and dressed exclusively in Western style,” Nancy Dupree says. From 1906 onward, this style “became the symbol of women’s education and emancipation.”The marriage of Khayriya, Tarzi’s daughter, to Inayatullah, Habibullah’s eldest son, was “a great event,” not so much because it began a new tradition – Afghan brides in the cities exchanged the colourful costumes of India and Pakistan for exquisite white European dresses – but because Khayriya and Inayatullah also introduced “the new concept of monogamy.”

Soraya Tarzi was the Queen of Afghanistan and the wife of King Amanullah Khan. She played a major part in the modernization reforms of Amanullah Khan, particularly regarding the emancipation of women. Wikimedia Commons.

“The liberalization of the nation through education and the modernization of a ‘small elite’ generated enormous opposition,” Ahmed-Ghosh points out. Habibullah’s assassination in 1919 was partly due to the fact, that “women’s education and state interference in marriage institutions challenged tribal powers and their patrilineal and patrilocal kinship systems.” Abidullah was succeeded by her third child, Amanullah. The constitution she passed in 1919 granted women the right to vote. Amanullah married Soraya, Tarzi’s daughter, and the royal couple made choices that Dupree considers “quite revolutionary for the time”.
Soraya sponsored the first school for girls that opened in 1921 in Afghanistan. The first female students who graduated from there went on to study nursing in Turkey: “a very controversial decision, because if conservatives already thought it was bad to have a formal secular education, sending young people abroad without male guardians” was almost heresy. Soraya and Amanullah “practised what they preached” Dupree assures.  They did not believe that women should be confined to their homes, and the queen often spoke in public.
At a Loya Jirga (general meeting) in 1928, she addressed a mixed audience wearing a short skirt. Uneasy about appearing without anything covering her face before delegates from all over Afghanistan, she wore a very thin muslin veil attached to the brim of her elegant hat, but this diaphanous veil, journalists at the ceremony noted, proved far more provocative than no veil at all.

Between 1927 and 1928, King Amanullah and Soraya embarked on a long journey, visiting Europe, Iran and the Soviet Union. Wikimedia Commons.

In 1927-1928, Amanullah and Soraya undertook a long journey that took them to Europe, Iran and the Soviet Union. Foreigners were “fascinated by an exotic monarch and a charming queen consort,”
wrote Hamida Ghafour.
Italians decorated Amanullah; the British gave him a Rolls-Royce and Soraya an honorary degree from Oxford University. “On his return to Kabul, the king summoned a thousand tribal leaders to a meeting, demanding that they don jackets and ties. After criticizing his delay in modernizing the country and insisting on the urgency of renewal, he scandalized the public by removing the queen’s veil, saying: Here she is, now you can see my wife.” (Open Photo: Old map of Afghanistan. 123rf)

M.S.L.

Myanmar. Four years of civil war amid international indifference.

The country marks the fourth anniversary of the coup by the military junta of General Min Aung Hlaing in 2021, forgotten by the rest of the world focused on other regional conflicts. What are the prospects
for this year?

The majority of the 51 million Burmese, from Yangon to Laishio and from Naypyidaw to Sittwe, will deplore the country’s entry into a fifth year of civil war, with thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees, and it is easy to imagine that the international community will largely ignore this sad anniversary.
On February 1, 2025, four years will have passed since the last military coup in the country that ousted the Lady of Yangon (Aung San Suu Kyi, 80 years old, who has hardly ever been seen in public since her arrest by the junta in February 2021 and whose health is said to be precarious).

Aung San Suu Kyi at an election campaign event, Yangon, Burma. In February 2021, she was arrested by the junta. Shutterstock/Simon Roughneen

It is in virtual anonymity, even in real indifference from the outside world, that this tormented, Buddhist-majority country, at the crossroads of Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the Chinese world is bogged down, suffers and hopes.
Lands that generals love to trample upon and dominate, somewhat less fond of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights than of deadly and destructive air raids, mass repression and other crimes against humanity. And all of this without stirring many people, especially, but not only in the great Western democracies.
Certainly, from the eastern fringes of Europe to the effervescent Middle East, not to mention the Indo-Pacific region, the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula or the South China Sea and its recurring procession of maritime incidents between coastal nations, the echoes of war, suffering and unspeakable violence resonate even more intensely in other theatres of crisis that monopolize much of the public attention.
A priori, the regional and international shockwaves of these various conflicts, tensions and interstate disputes have a much greater impact on regional balances, stability and supply chains of a globalized economy than the more timid and less destabilizing ones emanating from the 676,000 km² of an entire Burmese territory that has been torn, from the North (Kachin State) to the South (Karen State, Tanintharyi region) and the West (Arakan) to the East (Shan State), by civil war.

A soldier from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Shutterstock/Simon Roughneen

A civil war almost under the radar at the beginning of 2025, pitting two irredentist and completely opposed segments of Burmese society against each other. On the one hand, the military junta (officially the State Administrative Council or SAC), which has always had a fierce contempt for the promoters of democracy and other civilian defenders of human rights in the modern history of Burma (since independence from the British crown in January 1948). On the other hand, a stubborn, resilient and resolute pro-democracy Burma has been growing for four years.
The latter is organized around a government of national unity in exile (the NUG, which includes several cadres of the National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi’s party), a noria of armed ethnic groups (the GEA, expert for decades in the handling of weapons and guerrilla warfare against the Burmese army) and a recent and eclectic galaxy of local citizen militias hostile to the junta (the People’s Defense Forces or PDF, now numbering in the hundreds). All this has been supported by a Burmese majority, exhausted by the weight and multifaceted cost of the conflict, but still standing, determined to free itself at all costs, once and for all, from the generals’ permanent grip on the course of Burmese affairs. Having understood that they would have to work alone for their liberation from the yoke of the military, they looked with understandable frustration at the outside world as it stood at the side of the Ukrainian population from the first day of the Russian invasion.

General Min Aung Hlaing, Chairman of the State Administrative Council and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar’s Armed Forces. CC BY 4.0/Tatarstan.ru

Despite General Min Aung Hlaing’s usual arrogance (he is the former head of the armed forces and No. 1 of the SAC) and his recent outbursts regarding the evolution of hostilities on various fronts, the military regime and its armed forces (150,000 soldiers plus various auxiliaries, including many local pro-junta militias) have continued to lose ground to the resistance forces since the autumn of 2023.According to observers and the NUG, the pro-democracy coalition forces now have “direct” control over only a third of the territory. The latter estimates that they now control almost 45% of the country. This is a testament to their resilience, determination, and the unwavering support of the majority of Burmese, despite being repressed, exhausted, and almost abandoned by the outside world.
For its part, Min Aung Hlaing’s SAC (which has been regularly announced over the past two years to have been sidelined by its generalist counterparts, but which has so far barely materialized) has made several announcements recently, on several occasions, without making much effort to appear credible.

Kyauktaw Township was bombed by Myanmar Air Force, in January 2025. CC BY 3.0/MPATV

First, it would be a matter of organizing general elections in the fall of 2025 (i.e. five years after having turned its back on the unfavourable and indisputable results of the last elections). The project has been rejected outright by Burmese civil society and the main pro-democracy political parties and denounced in advance by Western capitals.
Second, the SAC would like to start peace talks with its main adversaries on the ground (in particular the ethnic armed groups of the Brotherhood Alliance, which consists of three of the most combative GEAs, which oppose Min Aung Hlaing’s army on several fronts: the Arakan Army, the TNLA and the MNDAA).
This project is supported, if not strongly encouraged, by the Chinese government, which offers its good offices, in its complex capacity as a common interlocutor for all parties to the conflict.
But in Burma, China is a mediator with a particular motivation, to say the least. Many Burmese assets, such as several large ongoing projects that make up the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (itself an important part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative), are now directly threatened by the protracted hostilities and the series of military setbacks suffered by the Tatmadaw (the official name of the Burmese army) over the past 15 months. Most notably in Shan State (bordering China’s Yunnan) and Arakan.

Duwa Lashi La, president of the NUG: “Our goal is to reach a turning point in 2025”. Facebook

Arakan is the starting point for oil and gas pipelines linking Burma and China’s Yunnan, as well as for the deep-water port and special economic zone of Kyaukpyu, both run by Chinese operators.
In early January, between enchantment and resolution, Duwa Lashi La, the president of the NUG, unveiled to the international press his roadmap for 2025, summarizing his remarks on a clear axis: “Our goal is to reach a turning point in 2025, a situation similar to that of Syria when Al Assad left his country. We must give the final blow to the SAC.” For his part, in his New Year’s speech, Min Aung Hlaing called on the people to work together “to end the conflict”, trying to convince the Burmese people – no one is forced to do the impossible – that his efforts are aimed “solely at resolving conflicts for the benefit of the nation and the people, promoting a stable and peaceful environment”.
On the part of the Burmese population, the NUG and the GEA, are paying close attention to the new administration in the White House, but are convinced that the unpredictable Donald Trump will not waste his efforts to restore Myanmar to being a peaceful territory. Instead, leaving China to do its work with predictable results. (Open Photo: Myanmar flag painted on background texture gray concrete. 123rf)

Olivier Guillard/Ad Extra

Herbs & Plants. Cassia alata. An herbal remedy for skin infections.

Commonly known as ringworm bush. This herbaceous plant belongs to the Leguminosae family and is widely distributed throughout Africa.

The young leaves of Cassia alata are not only consumed as a vegetable after cooking but are also valued for their nutritional value.
The roasted leaves serve as a viable alternative to coffee, providing a caffeine-free option for aficionados.
Furthermore, the young pods of the plant are cooked and incorporated into various dishes as another nutritious vegetable source.
In addition to its culinary applications, Cassia alata has a rich pharmacological profile, making it a valued resource in traditional systems of medicine. The plant exhibits several medicinal virtues, including anti-inflammatory, antimicrobial, and antifungal properties. These properties have made it particularly effective in the treatment of various skin conditions, earning it the colloquial name of the ringworm plant due to its historical use in the treatment of skin conditions such as ringworm and other fungal infections.

In cultivation, Cassia alata is valued not only for its medicinal potential but also for its ornamental appeal. Its deciduous nature and branching, as well as its ability to reach heights of up to eight meters, contribute to its aesthetic value and make it a sought-after addition to gardens and landscapes in tropical and warm temperate regions.
Cassia alata has a rich history in traditional herbal medicine, where it has been used for centuries to treat a wide range of ailments.
Its efficacy in the treatment of fungal infections, particularly ringworm, has established it as a potent antifungal agent. In addition, its laxative, purgative, and antifungal properties have contributed to its dual role as an ornamental and medicinal plant.
In various traditional medical practices, ringworm bush is highly valued for its versatility in treating scabies, eczema, and tinea infections. It is also used in the treatment of systemic diseases such as typhoid, diabetes, and malaria, as well as respiratory diseases such as asthma.
The holistic approach to using Cassia alata involves the entire plant, with different parts being used to treat various ailments. Decoctions derived from the stem, leaves, and roots are used to treat wounds, skin infections, respiratory infections, burns, diarrhoea, and constipation. In addition, preparations made from the stem, bark, and leaves are effective in treating conditions such as haemorrhoids, inguinal hernias, syphilis, intestinal parasitosis, and diabetes.

The seeds and roots are used specifically to regulate uterine disorders and combat parasitic infestations. The leaves and flowers are used for their antifungal and laxative properties, while the seeds are used to treat asthma
and improve vision.
Decoctions made from the flowers and leaves are administered for conditions such as ringworm, scabies, blotches, and eczema. In addition, in some African cultures, the bark decoction is applied topically during tribal markings and tattooing procedures.
In particular, the leaves of Cassia alata are the most commonly used part of the plant due to their higher concentration of active metabolites. The leaves of Cassia alata, when ground into a fine texture resembling “green cotton,” are mixed with vegetable oil and applied to the affected areas several times a day, with fresh preparations made daily. This concoction serves as an antidote for body and abdominal pain, stress, toothache, and skin infections, and also acts as a laxative and antispasmodic. In addition, the leaf decoction stimulates bowel movement and prevents constipation by increasing peristaltic contractions and reducing water absorption from the colon.
During childbirth, communities use fresh leaves to relieve the pain of childbirth and aid in delivery. Boiled leaves are ingested to treat constipation and intestinal worms, while leaf pastes are applied topically to treat skin conditions such as ringworm.
The leaf sap is used for skin infections, and when taken internally, it acts as a laxative to cleanse the blood, treat biliousness, and treat hypertension. In various forms – tinctures, compresses, oil-infused powders, or sap applications – the leaves effectively treat skin disorders such as blemishes, scabies, and fungal infections like ringworm.
In traditional medicine, the root of Cassia alata is brewed into an infusion to treat diarrhoea, tympanites, and uterine problems, and to facilitate the expulsion of filarial worms.

Externally, the root is used to treat wounds and fungal skin infections. In certain African communities, the stem, bark, and leaves are used to treat gastroenteritis, hepatitis, ringworm, and various skin infections. The bark, in particular, is used to treat skin diseases, diarrhoea, parasitic skin diseases, scabies, and eczema, demonstrating the wide range of therapeutic applications of the plant in treating gastrointestinal problems, skin diseases, and parasitic infections.
The flowers of Cassia alata serve as both a laxative and a vermifuge. Infusions of these flowers are used to treat spleen disorders, while a decoction combined with Zingiber officinale (ginger) serves as a treatment for influenza and as a vermifuge. In addition, a mixture of the flowers with coconut milk is decocted for use as a laxative. The leaves, flowers, and fruit are combined in an infusion to treat stomach problems together. In addition, the seeds have laxative and anthelmintic properties and are boiled and used as a remedy for intestinal worm infestations. This comprehensive use of different parts of the plant demonstrates its versatility in traditional medicine, providing remedies for a range of gastrointestinal problems and parasitic infections. (Photos: 123rf)

Richard Komakech

 

New Infrastructure Corridors: Ready, Set, Go?

In a rapidly globalizing world, new trade corridors aim to transform global trade, but their success depends on overcoming challenges, with some built on solid foundations and others on shaky policies.

In a rapidly evolving world, where connectivity serves as the backbone of globalization, there is surprising growth in several new trade corridors that demonstrate innovative political and economic thinking. Some of them may succeed. The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, the North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the Iraq Development Road Initiative are emerging with the promise to be transformative trade and transit forces.

However, all of the glittery new trade routes may not prove to be gold. These projects promise to reshape global trade dynamics and geostrategic alignments, addressing connectivity gaps exacerbated by geopolitical upheavals, climate challenges, and shifting economic priorities, but they are works in progress, some must undertake very heavy lifts to succeed. However, some are built on solid foundations while others rely on precarious policy pillars.

Iraq’s Development Road Initiative
Iraq’s ambitious Development Road Initiative is a key example of how connectivity projects can redefine a nation’s role on the global stage. This project aims to connect Asia with Europe via a network of railways, roads, ports, and urban centres. At its heart lies expansion of the Grand Faw Port in southern Iraq, linked to Turkey and extending further into Europe. The Iraq-centric initiative could rival Egypt’s Suez Canal by significantly reducing travel time between Asia and Europe.

The project’s geopolitical implications are profound. By turning Iraq into a transit hub, the needed initiative seeks to strengthen the country’s geopolitical position and contribute to regional prosperity, security, and stability. If successfully implemented, Development Road could transform Iraq from a conflict-scarred nation into a critical player in global logistics. However, Iraq’s unstable political system can be problematic in convincing the key donors and partners the European Union, Türkiye, UAE, and Qatar, as well as international businesses, about the project’s long-term viability.

The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)
While the war in Gaza has temporarily stalled IMEC, this US-led corridor remains a grand vision for connecting India and the EU via the Gulf.  Designed to counter China’s influence, IMEC aligns with India’s goal of becoming a global leader among developing nations and escaping Beijing’s strategic encirclement. Simultaneously, the UAE and Saudi Arabia view the corridor as an opportunity to cement their roles as economic bridges between East and West.

If realized, IMEC could bolster Europe’s economic resilience, diversify global trade, and foster cooperation among major powers. By reducing dependency on traditional chokepoints like the Suez Canal, it offers a resilient alternative to maritime routes increasingly vulnerable to climate and geopolitical risks. IMEC could also bring BRICS and G7 countries together if the many partners and investors can coordinate on the various development dynamics tied to diversification and de-risking their economies.

Central Asia and the Middle Corridor
Central Asia and the Caucasus are undergoing a profound transformation, evolving from a peripheral region into a key player in global connectivity, connecting North, South, East, and West through a multi-modal network of rail, road, and sea lanes.

The processes unleashed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have accelerated this development. Previously regarded as a remote region dominated by energy exports, the region is now becoming a vital hub for trade and investment and an alternative to Russia’s sanctions-impaired Northern Corridor.

This new Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor connects East with West, from China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, but also expects to link readily with the Global South through a series of new infrastructure investments that are being bolstered through tens of billions of Dollars, Euros, and many other currency investments.

The Middle Corridor has already benefited from investments and historic cooperation from the countries in the region, promising more savings in time and expenditure to come through increased customs harmonization and digitalization of transit processing. The corridor provides a faster alternative to maritime routes, with transit times of 12-15 days from China to the Black Sea as compared to 30-40 days for shipments from China to Europe by sea.

The North-South Corridor (INSTC)
The INSTC links Russia, Iran, and India through Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, offering the promise of a strategic alternative to traditional maritime routes. Premised on the promise of reducing transit times by up to 40% and costs by 30-40%, the corridor connects sanctions-plagued Russia and Iran with the Global South and international sea lanes. While there is a potential to strengthen economic ties among participating nations and to diversify connectivity for landlocked Central Asian states, international sanctions, infrastructure gaps, and political instabilities along the route pose significant risks to INSTC’s viability and remain significant barriers to its full operationalization.

Geo-Political and Geo-Economic Implications
These emerging corridors signify shifting power dynamics in global trade and geopolitics, as new players seek entry points. By providing alternatives to traditional routes, they empower regional players and reduce dependency on dominant powers. The Middle Corridor strengthens Türkiye’s role as a transit hub, connects Central Asia and the Caucasus countries to global markets, and aligns with China’s efforts to diversify trade routes. The INTSC enhances India’s connectivity with Central Asia and positions it as a counterbalance to China in the region, as well as provides Iran and Russia access to trade that reduce the risks of international sanctions.

Iraq’s Development Road repositions Iraq as a global logistics hub, reducing reliance on the Suez Canal, but requires significant political and economic cooperation.

The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor promises connectivity for India, empowerment for Gulf countries as trade-transit countries, and offers Europe another opportunity to diversify supply chains and reduce dependency on Russian routes.
But IMEC is hostage to the war in Gaza and a series of geopolitical instabilities.

The new infrastructure corridors represent a new chapter in global connectivity. They hold the potential to transform trade, strengthen regional integration, and challenge traditional chokepoints like the Suez Canal and the Straits of Malacca. As the world grapples with rising geopolitical tensions and climate challenges, these corridors offer a potential blueprint for resilient and diversified trade networks.  However, realizing their promise requires addressing logistical, political, and economic hurdles. While some countries are overcoming the need for historic and groundbreaking cooperation to achieve sustainable development, in other cases, some routes may remain more a promise than a reality. (Photo: Oil tanker ship. 123rf)

Eric Rudenshiold/ISPI

Bolivia. The Birth and Growth of Ayoreo Children.

The Ayoreo are an ethnic group living in eastern Bolivia. There are about 4,000 people and they are distributed in 29 communities. A look at the birth and education of the children.

Ayoreo women prefer to give birth in their community because they want to continue with their ancestral practices, which consist of receiving a series of massages and taking of certain herbs that assist childbirth.
When the time comes for the birth, the father calls an expert woman from the community or a relative of the mother who will act as a midwife. If there are difficulties during the birth, the dahisnai
(ancestral doctor) is immediately called.
As soon as he or she arrives, the dahisnai performs his or her rituals with songs to strengthen the mother in labour.

A little Ayoreo girl. File swm

Ayoreo women give birth squatting, resting their backs on the midwife’s knees. It is said that in the past, Ayoreo women practised rigorous family planning. While the newborn baby was breastfed and could not yet walk, further pregnancies were avoided to ensure good growth and adequate care. This plan required that the woman should not have sexual relations with the father, because, according to her worldview, sperm deteriorates breast milk. According to the elders, if the woman had consecutive pregnancies, the life of the newborn would be at risk of chronic disease. If twins were born, infanticide was practised, as it was considered something abnormal. According to the Ayoreo concept, this was not an act of violence but a sign of respect for human life.

Education, the responsibility of the extended family.
As for the education and care of the child in its evolutionary development process, it is primarily the mother’s responsibility. However, children’s education is also the responsibility of the extended family. Boys and girls are treated with great affection because they represent the continuity of human life. In interactions between children and adults, low-voiced conversation and eye contact are essential.
The education of children in the Ayoreo community is based on daily life practices. They learn, for example, to hunt, fish, plant and perform other activities of daily life. In addition, they are oriented in an egalitarian sense, characterized by the absence of social stratification and the accumulation of power and wealth.

An Ayoreo woman with his little child. The education and care of the child is primarily the responsibility of the mother. File swm

This principle of equality is the basis of all aspects of the socio-cultural and political system. That is why girls and boys are introduced to this logic. As a result, knowledge is not limited to certain sectors of society but is accessible to all.
For example, the right to land: everyone must have their land and no one can be left without it. That is why their education is based on the principles of sharing, love, and solidarity, which allows them to build a harmonious and community fabric. Added to this is work and the importance of agriculture, creating small orchards and plantations and growing their crops in dispersed areas.
According to their cosmovision concept, the environment is generous and offers everything necessary for living. That is why it must be cared for with great appreciation and its generosity must not be abused, because otherwise, that abuse would fall on them in one way or another. Therefore, nature must be cared for, and respected.

A mutual participation
Another important aspect is the division of labour between the two sexes, conceived as complementary and as a mutual participation of duties and exchange of tasks. For example, it is up to the man to go hunting and look for honey to support daily life. The woman, on the other hand, helps or participates in the harvest and family decisions.

Colourful toucan bird sitting on a branch in the jungle.123rf

Duties are learned from childhood by observing and imitating the activities of adults. In this way, children are included in community activities.The learning of boys and girls increases with the development of their skills and with the progression of age. The elders accompany the boys on fishing and hunting excursions. The girls, however, stay at home to help their mothers with the harvest. This is why the ancestral education of the Ayoreo is closely linked to the forest and the grasslands, which are fundamental spaces for the training of the indigenous people in the knowledge of the local flora and fauna.

Jhonny Mancilla Pérez

 

The Climate Crisis: Five Things to Watch Out for in 2025.

The Amazonian city of Belém, Brazil, will be the global focus of efforts to tackle the climate crisis in November 2025, when it hosts one of the most significant UN climate conferences in recent years.

Can we keep 1.5 alive? – “Keep 1.5 alive” has been the UN’s rallying cry for a number of years, a reference to the goal of ensuring that average global temperatures don’t soar beyond 1.5 degrees higher than pre-industrial levels. The scientific consensus is that a lack of action would have catastrophic consequences, not least for the so-called “frontline States”, such as developing island nations which could disappear under the ocean, as sea levels rise.

At COP30, the UN climate conference scheduled to take place between 10 and 21 November 2025, mitigation (in other words, actions and policies designed to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to rising temperatures) is likely to a key focus.

The nations of the world will arrive with upgraded, more ambitious commitments to lowering greenhouse gases. This is both a recognition that existing pledges are wholly inadequate, in terms of getting temperatures down, and part of the deal that Member States signed up to in 2015 at the Paris COP (nations are expected to “ratchet up” their commitments every five years. The last time this happened
was at the 2021 Glasgow COP, delayed by one year because
of the COVID-19 pandemic).

Protecting nature – Holding COP30 in the Amazonian rainforest region of Brazil is of symbolic importance. It harks back to the early days of international attempts to protect the environment: the pivotal “Earth Summit”, which led to the establishment of three environmental treaties on climate change, biodiversity, and desertification, took place in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

The location also highlights the role that nature has to play in the climate crisis. The rainforest is a massive “carbon sink”, a system that sucks up and stores CO2, a greenhouse gas, and prevents it from entering the atmosphere, where it contributes to warming.

Unfortunately, rainforests and other “nature-based solutions” face threats from human development, such as illegal logging which has devastated huge swathes of the region. The UN will continue efforts begun in 2024 to improve the protection of the rainforest and other ecosystems, at biodiversity talks due to be resumed this month of February in Rome.

Who’s going to pay for all this? – Finance has long been a thorny issue in international climate negotiations. Developing countries argue that wealthy nations should contribute far more towards projects and initiatives that will enable them to move away from fossil fuels, and power their economies on clean energy sources. The push back from the rich countries is that fast-growing economies such as China, which is now the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, should
also pay their share.

At COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, a breakthrough of sorts was made, with the adoption of an agreement to triple the amount of climate finance paid to developing countries, to $300 billion per year, by 2035.
The deal is a definite step forward, but the final sum is far less than the $1.3 trillion that climate experts say these countries need in order to adapt to the crisis.

Expect more progress to be made on financing in 2025, at a summit in Spain at the end of June. The Financing for Development conferences only take place once every 10 years, and next year’s edition is being billed as an opportunity to make radical changes to the international financial architecture. Environmental and climate concerns will be raised, and potential solutions such as green taxation, carbon pricing and subsidies will all be on the table.

Laying down the law – When the attention of the International Court of Justice turned to climate change in December, it was hailed as a landmark moment with regards to States’ legal obligations under international law.

Vanuatu often experiences destructive extreme weather, such as typhoons, which are being exacerbated by climate change. Vanuatu, a Pacific island state particularly vulnerable to the crisis, asked the court for an advisory position, in order to clarify the obligations of States with regard to climate change, and inform any future judicial proceedings.

Over a two-week period, 96 countries and 11 regional organizations took part in public hearings before the Court, including Vanuatu and a group of other Pacific islands States, and major economies including China and the USA.

The ICJ will deliberate for several months before delivering its advisory opinion on the subject. Although this opinion will be non-binding, it is expected to guide future international climate law.

Plastic pollution – UN-convened talks on getting to grips with the global epidemic of plastic pollution edged closer to a deal during negotiations in Busan, South Korea.

Some key advances were made during the November 2024 talks – the fifth round of negotiations following the 2022 UN Environment Assembly resolution calling for an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment.

Agreement on three pivotal areas needs to be ironed: plastic products, including the issue of chemicals; sustainable production and consumption; and final member States are now charged with finding political solutions to their differences before the resumed session begins, and with landing a final deal that addresses the full lifecycle of plastics and delivers on the growing global momentum to
end plastic pollution.

“It is clear that the world still wants and demands an end to plastic pollution,” said UN Environment Programme (UNEP) Executive Director Inger Andersen. “We need to ensure we craft an instrument that hits the problem hard instead of punching below its potential weight. I call on all Member States to lean in.” (Photo: Br.gov.)

Conor Lennon

Nigeria – Europe Gas Pipeline. The Babel of Gas.

The construction of a gas pipeline linking Nigeria to the southern coast of Europe could change the European Union’s energy balance, making it less dependent on Russian gas. However, the large-scale project faces several challenges and raises numerous questions, some arising from the complex situation in West Africa.

The first issue concerns the infrastructure route, for which there are two alternatives. The shortest route proposes a 4,000-kilometer route from Nigeria to Algeria, through Niger and the Sahara Desert, to connect to existing gas pipelines on the Algerian coast.
From there, it would have to be decided whether the gateway to the European Union (EU) would be in Italy or Spain.
The second alternative envisages travelling over 7,000 kilometres of the West African coastline, of which 5,660 are underwater and another 1,700 over land, as far as Morocco, where the gas would enter Europe via Cadiz (Spain). Although distances are important in the balance, there are several factors to consider in discerning the route that best serves the interests of Nigeria and the EU, and the main actors in a project that would benefit Algeria and Morocco depending on the route chosen.

Gas pipeline under water. The second option is to travel along 7,000 kilometres of West African coastline. 5,660 of these kilometres are underwater. Shutterstock/Marko Aliaksandr

By signing bilateral treaties with the two Maghreb countries, Nigeria has sought in recent years to encourage competitiveness between the two nations, albeit with an air of chaos and uncertainty about the final outcome.On January 24, 2024, the Executive Vice President of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Olalekan Ogunleye, and the Director General of the National Office of Hydrocarbons and Mines of Morocco, Amina Benkhadra, met to discuss the progress of the contract awarded by Nigeria in 2022 to Worley Energy for the design of the main engineering of the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline.
But a month earlier, in December 2023, Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar said that the pipeline linking Nigeria to Algeria had made “significant and noteworthy progress.” According to recent reports of the Nigeria-Algeria pipeline, which would be able to supply Europe with 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year, “only 100 kilometres remain in Nigeria, 1,000 in Niger and 700 in Algeria”.

The Group Managing Director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Mallam Mele Kyari. An investment of 25 billion dollars would be in place for the Moroccan option. Facebook

The agreements signed by Abuja and Algiers appear to have a more official character thanks to the participation of high-level officials, as in the case of the signing of a treaty between the Nigerian and Algerian Energy Ministers in 2022, although in October of the same year the director of the National Nigerian Petroleum Company Limited, Mele Kyari, indicated that by the end of 2024, an investment of 25 billion dollars would be announced for the construction of the Moroccan option.
The Islamic Development Bank has also agreed with the Moroccan Ministry of Economy to finance a feasibility study of the pipeline for 90 million dollars, while the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has committed to financing the second phase of the study with 14.3 million dollars. The Moroccan project also involves, among others, the global consultancy firm ADVISIAN, which is in charge of exploring energy self-sufficiency in the region. This sleight of hand between Nigeria and Morocco and Algeria makes it necessary to analyse both alternatives to verify their feasibility and the benefits they can bring to the European energy market.

From Nigeria to Guinea
The Moroccan project calls for the pipeline to run along the coasts of 11 African nations – Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Senegal and Mauritania – plus Western Sahara. Some have suggested that this route could be used to supply gas to the aforementioned territories. Currently, a 678-kilometer stretch between Nigeria and Ghana is in operation, owned by the West African Gas Pipeline Company Limited, whose shares are held by Chevron (36.7%), Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (25%), Royal Dutch Shell (18%), Volta River Authority of Ghana (16.3%), Societé Togolaise de Gaz (2%) and Societé Beninoise de Gaz (2%).

Oil pipes and valves. The Moroccan project calls for the pipeline to run along the coasts of 11 African nations. 123rf

In this option, the first challenge concerns Nigeria. For decades the country has been experiencing a security crisis that affects almost its entire geography, due to the jihadist threat in the north, the conflict between herders and farmers, plus kidnappings and piracy that is rampant in the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea. In this enclave and at the mouth of the river, where some of the main oil extraction facilities are located, bandits have been operating regularly for decades, stealing crude oil to sell on the black market, a practice that Nigerian security forces have not been able to eradicate.
Relations between Nigeria and its western neighbour Benin are highly dependent on Nigerian consumption. Although there have been moments of tension, such as when Abuja closed its border with Porto Novo between 2019 and 2021, the two countries are currently collaborating in Operation Prosperity to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Although the results have been positive, everything suggests that the intervention of European or US forces would be necessary to ensure the protection of these infrastructures in the area.

President of the Ivory Coast, Alassane Ouattara. Regional leadership is being contested by Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria. Photo: US Dep.

The Ivory Coast, through which the pipeline would pass, could benefit from the project for the possible supply of gas it would receive, but President Alassane-Ouattara is not unaware that a pipeline of this scale would represent a major economic and geostrategic boost for Nigeria, a nation with which the Ivorians are competing for regional leadership.Although the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia are now far away, neither country is a stranger to the delicate situation in the region. Sierra Leone suffered an attempted coup in August 2023 and the Liberian elections of the same year, in which Joseph Boakai won, highlighted the political and social tensions in the country.
The equation is complicated in the Republic of Guinea, where Colonel Mamady Doumbouya has ruled since the 2021 uprising. The military officer has barely changed Guinea’s foreign policy since coming to power and maintains close trade relations with Russia while tending to collaborate with Sahelian countries governed by military juntas. Although Guinea is not part of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Doumbouya’s reliability in a project of the scale of the pipeline is questionable.

Difficulties and questionable partners
The complications continue in Guinea-Bissau. Its 88 islands serve as a gateway to Africa for cocaine from South America, which leads to high levels of violence and corruption in the country, governed by Umaro Sissoco-Embaló. The situation is unstable on the streets which are patrolled by Senegalese and Nigerian soldiers on an ECOWAS mission. The main opposition leader, Domingo Simões Pereira, has expressed his firm opposition to the pipeline. If he wins the next presidential elections, to be held this year, his position could make it difficult for the pipeline to pass along the coast of Bissau.
Senegal may be considered be one of the most reliable partners for the project thanks to its excellent relations with Morocco and Nigeria, but the election of Bassirou Diomaye Faye in March 2024 makes the future unclear. The Senegalese president included in his speech the break with French neocolonialism and European interference, in addition to announcing the intention to develop new models of cooperation with Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. In addition, his ideological proximity to the military juntas of the Alliance of Sahel States undermines Senegal’s credibility in undertaking a project that requires sustainable relations with ECOWAS and Europe.

The presence of gas in Senegalese waters has led to a slight deterioration in relations with Mauritania. File swm

The discovery of natural gas reserves in Senegalese territorial waters means that its interest in Nigerian gas is not urgent. Abuja and Rabat should convince Dakar to propose an alternative that would allow the outlet of Senegalese gas through the same pipeline, thus linking Senegalese energy development to the feasibility of the project.
The presence of gas in Senegalese waters has led to a slight deterioration in relations with Mauritania, while Morocco’s relations with Mauritania are unstable due to Rabat’s expansionist policy in the Western Sahara conflict. Although many members of the Polisario Front are located in the Mauritanian desert, the country officially maintains a position of “active neutrality”.
The economic incentive that a gas pipeline would bring to Morocco would strengthen its position on the regional chessboard, a reality that does not necessarily fit with Mauritanian interests.

The flag of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Saharawi activism is showing strong opposition to the project. File swm

The Saharawi question also raises doubts. The recent ruling of the High Court of Justice of the EU, which ruled in favour of the Polisario Front and annulled the agricultural and fishing agreements signed with Morocco because they did not include the Saharawi people, could represent an obstacle to the project. The need to delimit Saharawi territorial waters meets the first dilemma in Morocco’s fisheries policy. In the current context, it is unlikely that the construction of a gas pipeline through Saharawi waters can be completed in a consensual legal framework. Giving Saharawi territorial waters to Morocco would be a serious blow to the sovereignty of the former Spanish colony. Alongside this factor, Saharawi activism is showing strong opposition to the project, undoubtedly supporting the Algerian route.
Then there is the economic factor since the cost of the pipeline is unknown and its construction could take 25 years. Although Morocco and Nigeria have assured that they will finance the project equally, it cannot be developed with the sole contribution of African states. Rabat and Abuja are counting on investment from the EU, whose willingness to support the infrastructure is essential for its viability.

The Algerian option
The Algerian route offers significant advantages over the Moroccan one. First, it would be quicker to build. In addition to the fact that a significant portion has already been completed, the distance covered by this pipeline would be shorter than that of the maritime pipeline. Although the desert weather conditions could pose logistical difficulties, they would be less decisive than those of an underwater pipeline.
The Algerian option seems to be the most sensible in economic terms, as well as the fastest, but three factors put its viability at risk.
The first is the Jihadist threat that is spreading in the Sahel. Armed groups are firmly entrenched in central and northern Mali, largely in Burkina Faso and southern and western Niger. A pipeline from Nigeria to Algeria must necessarily pass through southern Niger under the threat of attack. If jihadist groups expand their areas of influence in Niger, the construction of the pipeline along its geography would become an almost insurmountable security challenge.

Rusty sign, natural gas line, in the desert. The Algerian route offers significant advantages over the Moroccan one. Shutterstock/U. Eisenlohr

Another factor worth noting is the current relationship between the military junta in power in Niger and Europe. Since Abdourahamane Tchiani came to power in July 2023, French soldiers stationed in the country have been expelled along with the French ambassador, as well as US troops stationed at Base 201. The European training mission EUCAP, which has been ongoing for over five years, and the number of mining contracts between Western companies and the Nigerien government have been reduced in recent months. The position of the military junta is opposed to France and the West as a whole, while it has shown increasing interest in collaborating with Russia in every possible area: from energy development to military cooperation to mining.
The current situation in Niger makes the Algerian option virtually unviable. The risk is too high considering that the EU would finance the majority of the project and that there would be no second chance in case of failure. In this context, Europe finds itself in a difficult situation that suggests that neither option will be fully developed in the foreseeable future. Either it builds a pipeline worth billions of euros over a quarter of a century, thus extending its dependence on Russian gas and relying on more than a dozen African nations, or it builds a pipeline through a territory infested with armed groups and ruled by an anti-European military junta. Both options carry great risk. (Open Photo: Pipeline through the desert. Shutterstock/Mike Browne)

Alfonso Masoliver

Major producers.

Due to its particular climatic conditions together with the know-how of European farmers and the means deployed by the CAP for over half a century, the European continent is a particularly favourable place for the cultivation of wheat, to which it allocates approximately 22 Mha, or 10% of the world total.

In recent years, European production has fluctuated between 125 and 140 Mt, while exports regularly exceed the threshold of 30 Mt.
This makes Europe one of the largest producers of wheat on a global scale, ranking second after the People’s Republic of China, as well as the second world exporter after the Russian Federation and ahead of the United States. These advantages, determined by the aggregation of individual countries and the legal and economic framework of the markets, would not be such if considered in a disaggregated form and observed by Member State. Therefore, the European Union as a whole, with an average of 17% of world flows over the last ten years of annual exports, constitutes a real agro-exporting power of wheat destined for the countries of North Africa, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco, but also China and Nigeria, while 40% of production remains within the European Union.

France. Mont Saint Michele abbey in a beautiful summer day. France alone accounts for an average of one-third of the wheat exported by the European Union. 123rf

Among the major producing countries, we have France, which alone represents on average a third of the wheat exported by the European Union, followed by Romania with almost 20% of the volume, then Germany with 15%, Lithuania with 7%, and finally Latvia and Bulgaria with 6% each. Around 40% of European wheat exports come from the areas of Eastern Europe that joined the European Union in the 21st century.
However, despite the European continent being one of the main areas of wheat production on a global scale, a quota of the product amounts to around 4-6 Mt per year of which a third is durum wheat. The main countries of origin of these imports are Canada, but also Ukraine, Russia, the United States, Moldova and the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, since the European Union does not have a common external agricultural (or cereal) policy, as the CAP acts as a reference framework only as an internal organisation and regulation tool, the various national products enter into competition with each other once they cross the European borders.

Grain dryer, train and scrap metal in the port of Odessa, Ukraine. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has had a major impact on Europe. The agri-food sector has not been spared and has suffered significant losses. 123rf

The negative effects of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that have strongly impacted Europe have not spared the agri-food sector, which has recorded significant losses. The Ukrainian crisis has generated significant distortions about trade between Ukraine and the countries of the Union, upsetting the balance on the quantities of imports/exports existing between these two areas. If we look closely, the quantities exported by the European side to Ukraine, in the period before the conflict, were equal to three billion euros, and imports were seven billion. A parameter completely overturned in 2022 with European exports always remaining at the same level while imports recorded a considerable increase, equal to thirteen billion, of which five related to direct imports from the five countries on the Eastern borders: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania.
This imbalance, as is obvious, has generated a close confrontation within the European Union in which the wheat resource has been the main object of contention. The suspension of duties on Ukrainian exports to the EU has diverted part of the Ukrainian harvest, no longer able to reach the previous outlet markets, towards Europe, flooding the markets of the eastern part with low-cost wheat. The producers of these countries have thus found themselves having to deal with a new competitor present on the market, also induced by the Commission, whose exported quantities, of a different quality compared to the European ones and less reliable in terms of health safety, have generated, a considerable drop in prices resulting in significant losses.

Tractor in the field. Spraying fertilization of wheat fields. 123rf

The European market, therefore, was the first to suffer the consequences of the impact of the conflict and the reconfiguration of value chains. Furthermore, within this intricate scenario that saw farmers in this part of Europe protesting with their governments and with the Commission to block the sending of aid to Ukraine until an agreement was found on wheat imports, other countries of the Union – Spain, Italy and France – continued to buy Russian wheat. A scenario in which the agri-food sector finds itself besieged by Ukrainian wheat imports, at a time when the sector must also pay the price resulting from other crises that, combined, gave rise to the sensational protest of tractors on the streets of Europe. (Open Photo: Machine harvesting field of wheat. 123rf)

F.R.

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