To facilitate its Arctic ambitions, China aims to increase bilateral influence over its Arctic pariah, Russia.

China’s northernmost tip is over 1,400 km south of the Arctic Circle. It sees the mass of sea, ice, and land as a new strategic frontier, and as Arctic space becomes increasingly critical for infrastructure and defense, China has set its cap to be a great polar power within the next decade.

There is a hitch: Arctic policy is primarily orchestrated by the eight countries that border the Arctic Ocean. Maritime routes and access are legislated through technical definitions, and without an Arctic border, China lacks inroads through these means.

China already claims to be a “near-Arctic state” with rights in the region. While the Chinese strategy respects the sovereignty of the eight Arctic nations, it asks that these nations also respect China’s relationship to the region. To cement this position, China has multiple inroads.

It can gain Arctic territory, such as part of Russia’s Siberia; by establishing tangible elements in which China has a stake to defend within the Arctic space, e.g., critical infrastructure, maritime routes, or license or ownership of raw materials in the Arctic; and by expanding the de facto or exercised definition of “Arctic” through diplomatic routes or through using Arctic issues to expand the venues
for Arctic discussion and policy.

China facilitates its Arctic ambitions by exercising leverage bi-laterally on the Arctic pariah, Russia. Siberia is huge and sparsely populated by Russians. In 2014, commentators assessed whether the Chinese state would be sending its population north.Making inroads into physical space – like claims to parts of Siberian territory – would be
a blunt move for China.

A gradual process, through requests for access, visa-free zones, zones of preference for Chinese businesses, the licensing, ownership, and extraction of natural resources, and requests to rename Siberian areas under Chinese names, are more in line with China’s ways of manoeuvring. Such actions set a benchmark for Chinese presence in the Arctic and normalize China as an Arctic actor.

Critical infrastructure is another key element of China’s Arctic strategy. China already utilizes Arctic shipping routes and is working to access the critical minerals and other natural resources the Arctic holds. The area is rich with sub-soil resources that can be extracted and used in China’s production and processing of rare earth elements and its access to natural gas.

The discussion over critical infrastructure and gas supplies has taken off most recently in the Russian-Chinese negotiations over the Power of Siberia 2 (PoS-2) pipeline. While China is the only reasonable market destination for eastern Siberian gas carried by 2014’s Power of Siberia pipeline, the PoS-2 is different.

A physical pipeline, which would originate from the Yamal Peninsula in Western Siberia and go on to supply China, would be a decisive shift of Russia’s natural gas market to the east. Yamal gas previously flowed west, carried by pipelines like Nord Stream. But the European desire for Russian hydrocarbons has decidedly taped off.

Both Power of Siberia projects are opaque, and though the Russian state claims Power of Siberia is lucrative, the numbers are not clear enough or public enough to confirm this. As with any critical infrastructure project that is shrouded in secrecy, there are hefty financing risks.

The pipeline infrastructure is not a closed deal, and it does not need to be. Russia and China have alternative ways to trade in natural gas, including through Central Asia (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have pipelines and significant gas export to China already) and through LNG, which includes Russia’s in-process Arctic LNG project.

China remains reluctant to make such a large commitment to Russia, which could cost China economic leverage in Europe. As a tool of influence, large infrastructure projects can be more powerful before they are confirmed than after the deal is done, and large infrastructure projects have been a double-edged sword for China’s reputation and solvency. China’s reluctance is complimented by – or evidence of – Russia’s weakened negotiating position vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine and the overspread of materials. European countries and the United States should take note.

A precedent of what “Arctic” means could shift. Concerns over further politicization of the Arctic Council is one reason the body is currently operating without Russia, with Russia’s Arctic leadership at a stalemate. The Arctic Council, which was under Russian leadership at the beginning of 2023, suspended all activities and only accepted Russia’s passing the rotating chairpersonship to Norway.

Bringing China further into the equation could deepen this freeze. But it is likely China will apply pressure. Similar to the soft inroads China has made to the Russian Arctic space, China could pick up on key issues for the Arctic Council and lobby to advance them.

Topics like environmental and climate change research, treatment of preserved areas, access to critical raw materials, and maritime routes are all areas where China is a genuine actor and has a stake. Lobbying these positions could result in a strategy where China tries to create parallel consulting groups or institutions – in the Arctic Council or elsewhere – to address these issues.

The other seven Arctic nations can expect China to try to work bi-laterally with them, as well. Aside from this, China might try to leverage other global actors to push for an expansion of the Arctic zone of interest; to this effect, China’s 2018 Arctic White Paper lists the area as a community for all of humankind, not just the Arctic Eight.

China could try to make overtures to the Arctic Council, but it is more likely that China will pursue and suggest alternative places for discussion, diplomacy, and policy. If they want to prevent China from establishing a foothold, other Arctic powers should be aware of these factors, especially China’s pressure on Russia and attempts to negotiate in other avenues on matters where it seeks an interest. The Arctic seven should work to clearly define Arctic policy agenda items, maintain the Arctic Council as the route for legitimate Arctic discussion, and remain true to the notion of an Arctic space. (Open Photo: 123rf.com)

Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
Finnish Institute of International Affairs