African allies are the potential linchpin in Beijing’s hands to globalize its interests. This is why this year’s FOCAC reaffirmed China’s commitment to the continent.

“In the next three years, China will work with Africa to undertake 10 partnership actions for modernization, in order to deepen China-Africa cooperation and lead the modernization of the Global South,” announced Chinese President Xi Jinping in his opening speech at the ninth edition of the triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC),
last September 5.

The rhetoric of solidarity between developing countries was a Chinese hobbyhorse since before the concept of the Global South gained the centrality in the international debate that it has today. And the FOCAC, whose first edition dates back to 2000, has always been the emblem
of this cooperation.

Today more than ever, faced with an increasingly fragile international governance system, African allies are the potential keystone in Beijing’s hands to globalize its interests. For this reason, as has already happened in the previous editions hosted in Beijing, the Chinese capital pompously welcomed almost 50 African leaders who arrived for the FOCAC.

Promises have not been lacking: after a more uncertain phase during the pandemic, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a 10-point action plan to relaunch the partnership with Africa for the next three years. The plan will include a $29.4 billion credit line, $11.2 billion in various forms of assistance, and at least $9.8 billion in investments in Africa by Chinese companies.

The financial commitment will therefore be less than the 60 billion from Focac 2018, but more than the 40 billion from the 2021 edition. All of this will be under the banner of modernization and sustainability, two words omnipresent in every speech by the Chinese leader. However, African leaders have already heard many promises from Beijing and many have not been kept.

Relations today continue to be heavily unbalanced in Favor of China, but everyone knows that Beijing remains an almost indispensable player. However, even for Xi’s China, the partnership with African countries is more crucial than ever. So, 24 years after the first Focac, how is Beijing’s economic and political strategy in Africa doing?

Today, China is the continent’s second trading partner, after the European Union, and the first in the sub-Saharan region. In 2023, trade reached 262 billion dollars. However, Africa’s trade deficit has also grown, amounting to around $45 billion (with a slight reduction expected this year).

Trade relations are part of a broader picture, in which investments also play a fundamental role, both in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and loans. The positive trend has taken shape since the beginning of the century, but the advent of the Belt and Road Initiative, the global initiative symbol of Xi Jinping’s China, has given further impetus to Beijing’s economic diplomacy in Africa.

From 2003, when they amounted to $75 million, the value of Chinese FDI flows to Africa has risen to $5 billion in 2021, and then decreased to around $2 billion in the past two years. Investments have been concentrated mainly in the construction, mining and manufacturing sectors. A small number of countries have benefited, especially those rich in natural resources.

As for loans, they have been the topic that has most sparked discussion about the benevolence, or otherwise, of Beijing’s intentions in Africa. Thanks to a greater propensity for risk, the absence of conditions linked to the allocation of funds and the lack of human rights standards, China has become the main bilateral creditor of many African countries, previously excluded or marginalized by the traditional international institutions of Bretton Woods.

Many of these, however, have had difficulty repaying the debts contracted with China: this has led to criticism of Beijing, accused of pushing African countries towards unsustainable levels of debt to strengthen its political and economic leverage, and to Chinese frustration over the problems in collecting the credits given.

Between 2000 and 2023, Chinese lenders have provided 1,306 loans for a total of 182.28 billion dollars to 49 African countries and seven regional lenders. The funds have been allocated mainly to the energy, transport, information and communication technology and financial sectors. In 2023, 13 new commitments worth $4.61 billion were added to eight African countries and two regional financial institutions.

It was the highest volume of loans since 2019, although well below the early years of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), when annual commitments exceeded $10 billion – a figure that, according to Nikkei projections, should return in the next 3 years. The five largest recipients of Chinese loans between 2000 and 2023 were Angola, Ethiopia,
Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya.

If we had to draw up a report, the economic picture for Beijing would be mixed. The decline in investments in recent years, especially regarding loans, reflects a certain Chinese disappointment with some operations that have turned out to be riskier and less profitable than expected.

The slow Chinese post-pandemic economic recovery, then, has brought with it a reduced propensity to make large investments abroad, especially in unstable contexts such as Africa. The new Chinese policy calls for “smaller and more sustainable” investments, aligned with its new direction towards sustainability and technology. An approach that was also reiterated by Xi Jinping during the last summit.

Despite expectations not fully met, Africa remains central to Beijing’s economic strategy: Chinese overproduction, particularly in sectors linked to the green economy, is frowned upon by European partners and the United States, but not by African countries.

China hopes that a “win-win relationship” can be developed, where African markets help absorb overproduction and, in turn, exploit this production to support a low-cost green transition, in line with the objectives of the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

In his opening speech, Xi Jinping reiterated that cooperation between China and Africa is not limited to economic integration, but includes a strong commitment to cultural (and therefore also political) relations. Beijing is well aware that the cultural and political aspects are deeply linked, which is why it has always combined economic diplomacy with a clear Soft Power strategy.

From a political point of view, the countries of the continent represent important allies for Beijing in resisting the pressure of Western powers. Whether it is to prevent the issue of human rights from being discussed at the UN, or to isolate Taiwan at a diplomatic level, African countries are fundamental pieces in shaping an international system more in line with the values, and above all the interests, of the People’s Republic.

For this reason, China is carrying out a charm offensive, courting African countries and their citizens, and leveraging the frustrations that have emerged from the relations between the latter and Western powers. This has occurred from a diplomatic point of view, with high-level meetings and the so-called Red Carpet Diplomacy, that is, always reserving a special welcome for African leaders.

The first trip of the year for over 34 years by the Chinese Foreign Minister has been to Africa, and Xi Jinping has visited the continent 5 times, more than Biden and Trump combined.

On a cultural level, the commitment is in no way inferior. Since 2004, numerous Confucius Institutes have been inaugurated and Beijing has sent 5,500 Chinese language teachers to Africa, in addition to television programs produced in China but broadcast in Africa.

In addition, China has established itself over the years as an increasingly popular destination for African citizens: in 2018 there were around 81,000, making China the second most popular destination for students on the continent after France.

China’s economic transformation has made the People’s Republic an attractive destination for young Africans, which has the great advantage of being much more economically accessible than Western destinations. China often offers scholarships as part of its Soft Power on the continent. Wen Wen, a researcher at Tsinghua University, says that “higher education is becoming part of geopolitics.” Beijing is thus investing in its African leaders of the future. (Photo: Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing –  fmprc)

Gabriele Manca/Ispi